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China’s Strategy towards the 
Financial Crisis and 
Economic Reform
Linda Yueh
China’s pragmatic attitude towards its own 30 years of reform can be used to similarly characterise its attitude toward the global fi nancial crisis of 2008 and the resultant push 
for further economic reforms. China was able to manage the downturn following 2008, and 
has a good chance of managing the consequences of Europe’s slowdown by undertaking 
fi scal and monetary stimulus. The debate over global imbalances has increased the need for 
nations to re-balance their economies, including China. The Chinese economy requires re-
balancing to sustain strong growth rates in the coming decades, with the slowdown in the West 
making the re-orientation towards growth by domestic demand an even greater imperative.
RE-BALANCING THE ECONOMY
The 20 million workers who lost their jobs in the export sector and the damage to Chinese GDP during 
the 2008 global fi nancial crisis have increased the impetus behind the already planned re-balancing 
of the Chinese economy. The 12th  Five Year Plan is focused on transforming the economy into a more 
sustainable model, so that the country can grow well for another 30 years.
The structure of the Chinese economy can evolve to become more akin to the United States and Japan, 
which are both large economies whose growth is primarily driven by domestic demand, but which are 
at the same time among the largest (third and fourth, respectively) traders in the world. In 1990, China 
was closer to the structure of the economies of the United States and Japan in that exports accounted 
for 12.9 percent of GDP in China and around seven percent in the United States and Japan. Since 
then, the success of the ‘open door’ policy has seen China’s economic balance come to resemble that 
of Germany. Exports in 2007 accounted for 56 percent of Chinese GDP and for 76 percent of German 
GDP (though it should be noted that intra-European trade in the single market accounted for around 
three-quarters of German trade). In 2009, when global trade contracted for the fi rst time since World 
War II – by 12.2 percent according to the WTO – both Germany and Japan experienced recessions that 
were deeper than in the United States, the epicentre of the fi nancial crisis. In China’s case, despite large-
scale redundancies in export industries, a technical recession was avoided through swift implementation 
of fi scal and monetary stimulus that succeeded in signifi cantly increasing domestic demand.
China could reduce its exposure to the volatility of the world economy by following a path to strengthen 
both internal and external demand, which would increase the portion of growth driven by domestic 
demand even as trade expands in absolute terms. Such restructuring will allow China to continue to benefi t 
from global integration, which includes learning from the technological advancements of developed 
economies, and to continue its ‘catch up’ growth, while maintaining a larger base of domestic demand 
to shield it from the worst excesses of external shocks. 
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Reorienting towards domestic demand means boosting 
consumption in China, that is, reducing households’ 
and fi rms’ tendency to save. Consumption fell from 
around 50 percent of GDP in the 1980s and early 
1990s to just under one-third by the late 2000s. 
In developed economies, consumption is typically 
between half and two-thirds of GDP, for example, in 
Germany it is 58 percent, Japan registers 60 percent 
and it was 72 percent in the United States on the 
eve of the 2008 global fi nancial crisis (the latter was 
generally considered to be too high).
For Chinese households, precautionary savings motives 
are important to address, particularly in rural areas, so 
China needs to make substantial investment in social 
security provision. There were some measures in the 
government’s stimulus plan of 2009, which increased 
health and pension spending, but more is needed. 
Developing the service sector will also boost domestic 
demand by increasing the non-tradable component 
of the economy, and by creating jobs in both the low 
and high-ends of the skills spectrum. Furthermore, 
increasing urbanisation can improve the earning 
potential of rural residents and boost consumption. 
Indeed, wage bills that have lagged behind output 
growth reduced workers’ share of national income, 
which in turn depressed consumption and caused it 
to shrink as a share of GDP. 
There has also been an increase in savings by fi rms 
(both state-owned and non-state-owned) during the 
2000s. China’s distorted fi nancial system is biased 
toward state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and private 
fi rms have trouble obtaining credit – either from 
banks or China’s underdeveloped domestic capital 
markets. Therefore, private fi rms rely heavily on 
retained earnings to fi nance their growth. SOEs, on 
the other hand, save because of the minimal taxation 
of their profi ts. These distorted incentives towards 
saving for fi rms meant that when China’s current 
account surplus was near 10 percent of GDP after 
2004, China’s investment maintained its share of 
GDP, even though investment is typically squeezed 
when countries develop a current account surplus. 
Consumption dropped as the motives for saving were 
undiminished by the export boom, and total savings 
rose instead. 
DOMESTIC REFORMS
The policy reforms needed to increase aggregate 
demand in this framework centre on reducing the 
savings rate of households and fi rms to generate 
higher output in the context of a smaller trade surplus. 
Greater government spending can also increase 
consumption and investment if undertaken to support 
private incomes and the effi ciency of capital markets. 
Household savings have averaged 19 percent of 
GDP since 1992, following the signifi cant opening 
of the Chinese economy, and the associated decline 
in domestic consumption’s share of GDP. Savings were 
already high, but they increased by a further eight 
percentage points after 2000, rising to 22 percent 
of GDP by 2007 at the onset of the global fi nancial 
crisis. For fi rms, the average savings rate was lower 
– at around 15 percent of GDP between 1992 and 
2007 – but this grew quickly to reach 22 percent of 
GDP by the mid-2000s. The remainder of Chinese 
savings derives from government, whose savings rate 
doubled from 5.2 percent in 2000 to 10.8 percent in 
2007. Taken together, China’s savings rate increased 
from 38 percent of GDP in the 1990s to a peak of 
nearly 52 percent by the late 2000s. Startlingly, the 
savings rate increased by 17 percentage points during 
the fi rst decade of the 21st century, mirroring the fall 
in consumption as a share of GDP from around 50 
percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 35 percent by 
the late 2000s.
Therefore, for households, addressing the savings 
issue centres on lagging wage and income growth; 
while for fi rms, reforming capital markets is critical. 
For households, income growth and removing the 
motives for precautionary savings would bring down 
the savings rate. Industrial output has grown at 14.1 
percent on average per annum for 20 years since 
1988, but wage growth has not kept pace. Industrial 
output grew at double the previous pace in the 2000s, 
averaging 23.1 percent per annum. Yet, the average 
annual real wage growth of urban employees was 
lower, at 11.9 percent over the period between 1995 
and 2008, and a paltry fi ve percent during the late 
1990s. Rural incomes have risen even more slowly. 
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In the 2000s, average wage growth was faster at 
14.9 percent per annum, but against a backdrop 
of industrial output growth exceeding 23 percent 
each year. Thus, because labour income has lagged 
behind output growth, consumption has fallen as a 
share of GDP. 
Moreover, labour productivity has increased seven-fold 
from 1980 to 2005, according to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), which suggests that wages 
do not match the marginal product of labour. Labour 
productivity has been improving in the 2000s since the 
signifi cant reform of labour markets at the end of the 
1990s, and the improvement has been hastened by 
recent supply-side tightening. The protests in 2009/10 
over low wages, and a reluctance of rural migrants 
to return or move to the cities, refl ects the potential 
for increased wage growth to match the marginal 
output of labour. In so doing, there need not be 
infl ationary pressures so long as higher wages prompt 
growth in labour productivity that matches any future 
wage increases and instead can increase incomes 
and boost consumption.
Other measures that can ease labour market tightness 
involve removing restrictions on mobility, that is, 
increasing urbanisation by allowing migrants to settle 
in urban areas. It would reduce segmentation in the 
labour market and increase the mobility of workers to 
fi nd matches to appropriate jobs and not be barred 
by geographic or hukou (household registration 
system) barriers. Urbanisation is a policy that has been 
proposed alongside renewed efforts to develop the 
services sector. The services sector increased steadily 
as a share of GDP from 23 percent in 1979 to 40 
percent in the 2000s but has not developed further. 
China has a lower share of services in GDP than 
comparably-sized economies where the services sector 
accounts for more than half of GDP (for example, in 
the United Kingdom it is over 80 percent). Services 
is a non-tradable sector as it includes items such as 
hair cuts and government services, and would help to 
increase both domestic demand and reduce savings if 
such service provision included the delivery of social 
security. Thus government spending on services can 
signifi cantly reduce the savings rate of the economy 
while boosting domestic demand and incomes. 
Urbanisation further allows the delivery of services 
to be distributed more effi ciently such that there can 
be greater economies of scale. For instance, health, 
pensions, unemployment, local services, and schools 
can all be developed as part of the services sector 
along with the infrastructure needed to support this 
development, which in turn increases the effi ciency 
of investment and associated industrialisation in the 
urban area. 
Together, internal and external sector reforms would 
improve the effi ciency of the urbanisation process 
by reducing the cost of imported inputs. It would 
further help on the income side for households 
since a stronger renminbi would reduce the cost of 
imports, particularly food, and increase disposable 
income. Removing the ‘ceiling’ on deposit rates would 
also increase interest income to households, which 
has plunged into negative territory, with infl ation 
exceeding the deposit rate in the late 2000s. The 
combination of internal and external re-balancing 
would thus assist with reducing household savings 
and increase output.
FINANCIAL REFORMS
Further liberalisation of interest rates would improve 
credit allocation to non-state sector fi rms and reduce 
the savings incentive for fi rms too. Although interest 
rates were partially liberalised, including in 2004 when 
the ceiling on inter-bank lending rates was lifted, there 
are still limits in terms of the ‘fl oor’ on the lending 
rate. Interest rates refl ect the internal rate of return to 
investment, so such controls distort lending decisions. 
These restrictions preserve bank margins in the same 
way that capital controls preserve the deposit base, 
but they lead to high rates of corporate saving. 
Such reforms should render the allocation of capital 
more effi cient even though the rate of investment 
may not increase, suggesting greater output for the 
same amount of invested funds. Returns on assets 
are high in China, but they are greater for all types 
of private fi rms than for SOEs and collectives. Yet 
SOEs continue to receive disproportionate amounts of 
credit despite being less productive. Without interest 
rate liberalisation and further reforms of the fi nancial 
system, the extent of fi nancial repression distorts 
credit allocation and induces saving by private fi rms, 
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which contributed as much as that by households to 
the increase in the savings rate in the 2000s. Wages 
below the marginal product of labour generate profi ts, 
but capital market reform will reduce the distortions 
to fi rm savings behaviour, particularly if it is linked to 
capital account reform.
CHINA’S OUTWARD INVESTMENT
Gradual capital account liberalisation, in particular 
the ‘going out’ policy that is encouraging Chinese 
fi rms to operate as multinational corporations, can 
reduce savings if fi rms are permitted to operate in 
global markets and are allowed to access funding 
from better-developed overseas credit markets. In 
other words, fi rms can raise money on capital markets 
and not just rely on China’s banking system with its 
controls on credit. 
More generally, state-owned enterprises and 
increasingly private fi rms have been encouraged by 
the Chinese government to ‘go out’ and compete 
on global markets. Launched in 2000, ‘going out’ is 
intended to create Chinese multinational corporations 
that are internationally competitive. By doing so, 
China aims to become more than a generic producer 
of low-end manufacturing goods, branded under the 
moniker of Western fi rms. Its fi rms’ ability to be as 
innovative and productive as leading global companies 
is an indicator of industrial upgrading, the very thing 
that China needs to ensure a sustained growth rate.
For instance, Haier is the largest white goods maker 
in China, and although it is sold in Walmart it does 
not command brand recognition and loyalty in world 
markets. The strategy of Lenovo, therefore, was to not 
only purchase IBM’s PC business but also to license the 
use of the brand name for fi ve years so that Lenovo 
can eventually assume the trusted name of IBM in 
world markets. These are all developments which 
took place starting in the mid-2000s, when the fi rst 
commercial outward investment by a Chinese company 
was permitted in 2004 with the purchase of France’s 
Thomson by electronics fi rm TCL. 
Most outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains 
state-led investments in energy and commodities, but 
the maturing of Chinese industry indicates that the 
trend is changing as China seeks to move up the value 
chain and develop multinational companies that can 
follow in the footsteps of other successful countries 
like Japan and South Korea. These countries, unlike 
most developing countries, managed to join the ranks 
of the rich economies through possessing innovative 
and technologically advanced fi rms that enabled them 
to move beyond what is sometimes termed the ‘middle 
income country trap’, where nations’ growth slows as 
they reach a per capita income level of $14,000. The 
process of growth through adding labour or capital 
(factor accumulation) slows or reaches its limit, and 
they are unable to sustain the double digit growth 
rates experienced at an earlier period of development. 
By increasing productivity instead through developing 
industrial capacity and upgrading that is stimulated 
by international competition, it is more likely that a 
country can maintain a strong growth rate. The need 
for energy as well as upgrading industrial capability 
is the motivating forces for China to invest overseas. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the 2000s, the share of 
commercial outward investment remains small whilst 
state-owned fi rms continue to constitute the bulk of 
outgoing FDI. The shape of things to come, though, 
points to China becoming a net capital exporter: the 
process of its fi rms ‘going global’ could herald an era 
of Chinese multinational corporations. 
There has been explosive growth of outward FDI since 
the mid-2000s, due not only to SOE investment in 
commodity sectors but also to commercial mergers and 
acquisitions of private companies like Lenovo, which 
purchased the IBM PC business for the then-record 
of $1.75 billion in 2005, later surpassed by Geely’s 
acquisition of Volvo for $1.8 billion in 2010. Becoming 
a net capital exporter is also viewed as a marker of 
a country reaching a level of industrial development 
where its fi rms are able to operate and compete 
on world markets. With outward FDI accelerating 
and close to overtaking inward FDI by the end of 
the 2000s, China could be on track to demonstrate 
that its industrial capacity is not only a function of 
foreign invested entreprises producing its exports, 
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but indicative of a more widespread upgrading of 
its industry. The policy aim of ‘going out’ or ‘going 
global’ looks to be being realised at the end of the 
fi rst 30 years of reform.
There are also a number of macroeconomic benefi ts. 
Capital account reform would not only reduce the 
motive for corporate savings but also cut the portion of 
the current account surplus that is funded through the 
purchase of US Treasuries by allowing capital outfl ows 
in the form of investments instead of accumulated in 
foreign exchange reserves. The exchange rate should 
also become more fl exible with greater capital account 
liberalisation since the capital account and the current 
account will require the renminbi for transactions. 
Recent measures to increase the use of the renminbi 
in trade arrangements already point to the growing 
internationalisation of the Chinese currency. Therefore, 
exchange rate and interest rate reforms together 
should produce a better balance between China’s 
internal (savings and investment) and external 
(balance of payments) positions and help to re-balance 
the economy.
CONCLUSION
China can be a fast growing, large, open economy 
– developing domestic demand and upgrading 
industry and promoting globally competitive fi rms – 
that recognises its wider impact because it is unlike 
small, open, export-led economies which do not 
affect the global terms of trade. Given China’s still 
low level of development, global integration would 
benefi t its own development as well as that of the 
world. These macroeconomic reforms will be important 
to position China optimally in a global economy 
that is signifi cantly different and more uncertain 
than before. By doing so, China could grow well 
in the years to come. It may have done something 
extraordinary in growing strongly for 30 years, but at 
per capita income levels of just $4,200, there is still 
considerable scope for ‘catch up’ growth and thus the 
importance of not only attracting investment via the 
‘open door’ policy, but also the increasing emphasis 
on ‘going out.’ By so doing, its global investments 
and corporations will affect the contours of the 
corporate sector internationally. 
Global imbalances have existed for some decades and 
their exacerbation in the 2000s formed the backdrop 
to the worst fi nancial crisis in a century. In the short-
term, the world has already somewhat re-balanced 
with the US current account defi cit falling from six 
percent to around three percent of GDP in 2010, and 
savings rising in recessionary countries. This further 
implies that China and other countries will need to 
re-balance their economies to sustain the rate of 
growth of the 2000s, which was driven by strong US 
imports and demand.
For surplus countries like China, loose American 
monetary policy can be transmitted via fi xed exchange 
rates, which leads capital to fl ow from low to high 
interest rate economies. Thus, China should gradually 
reform its exchange rate to prevent domestic asset 
bubbles such as those that have occurred in the non-
tradable real estate sector. Increasing the fl exibility 
of the renminbi exchange rate before tightening 
monetary policy will also be important as an increase 
in the interest rate in China – while the United States 
Federal Reserve is committed to maintaining a near-
zero interest rate – will only worsen the capital infl ow, 
eroding the impact of tightening measures. 
Therefore, reforming the exchange rate and the 
interest rate can induce higher output growth if the 
switch to higher consumption can be managed while 
the trade surplus is smaller. The continuation of global 
imbalances further implies that such liberalisation 
must be carefully regulated to prevent destabilising 
capital fl ows as global liquidity will remain an issue. 
Re-balancing China will not correct global imbalances, 
but the acute management of the trade surplus along 
with a recognition that such action will have some 
effect on re-balancing the global economy will mean a 
more sustainable growth path for China and perhaps 
the world economy. In other words, China’s policies 
towards re-balancing are promising steps to transform 
its economy into a stable and prosperous society with 
positive benefi ts for the rest of the world. However, 
it will need to decide that it will aim to become a 
large, open economy and decisively move away from 
excessive reliance on export-led growth, which is more 
feasible in any case at this stage of development. 
China’s decision on that front will shape its destiny 
in the coming decades. ■
